ON 13 JULY 2026 the Jerusalem Post ran an opinion piece under the headline “Arabs, not Jews, are the real colonizers in the Middle East.”¹ The case runs the way it always runs. The Arab armies of the seventh century took North Africa, the Levant, Persia. They settled where they conquered. They put a tax on the people who were already there and did not convert, and over the centuries the older languages and the older faiths were pushed to the edges. That, the piece says, is colonisation — the real thing, the thing with a thirteen-hundred-year record. The Jewish return to the land is its opposite: not colonisation but the undoing of it. And the Palestinians, who object, are not a people with a grievance but a political construction assembled for the purpose of objecting. Then the conclusion, in four words.
“They are the colonizers.”
The piece gives no sources for any of its history. The argument depends on the reader already believing it.
The author is Aliza Pilichowski. The Post describes her as an interfaith hospice chaplain in Jerusalem and the mayor of Mitzpe Yeriho.
Mitzpe Yeriho is an illegal Israeli settlement. It was established in 1978 on the cliffs above Jericho, on the road down from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea.² Around 2,500 people lived there at the 2019 count.³ It stands on territory the International Court of Justice holds to be occupied, and its existence is the kind of act the Court found in July 2024 to be contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention — the Convention Israel signed in 1949 and ratified in 1951.⁴ ⁵
So the argument that the Arabs are the real colonisers of the Middle East was published by the mayor of a settlement built on occupied land above an Arab city, in breach of a treaty her own government bound itself to seventy-five years ago.
But the argument is not hers alone. It circulates under every report from the West Bank, in the comment threads and the talking points and the opinion columns, and it runs like this. Muslims colonised half the known world, so they have no standing to complain about anyone else’s colonialism; and a Muslim who complains anyway has shown that the complaint was never about land.
The argument stands on one word, and the word is wrong. What the Muslims did was conquer, and colonialism is not conquest. Every empire conquered — Rome, Persia, the Arabs, the Turks — and a conquest takes a land and rules the people on it as its own. A colony keeps the people of the land it takes outside the country that took it, whatever the map says, and either works them or clears them off. The British ran colonies of both kinds, and so did the French. The Arab armies of the seventh century ran neither. They moved their capital into the land they had taken, so there was no outside to keep anyone from, and they kept the people where they found them, because the people were what they had conquered for. What Israel has done since 1948 takes the land and removes the people from it: seven hundred thousand in the first year, and it has not stopped. The obvious objection is that a fifth of Israel’s citizens are Arab, so the people were not removed. But they are the descendants of the one in five who remained in 1948, and the state they remained in has since written into its constitutional law that the country is not theirs. Remove most of a people, keep the remainder outside the nation that governs them, and put them to use: that is not conquest under another flag. It is colonialism twice over. The Knesset put it in writing in 2018.
And the word is theirs. Settler colonialism is not a slur that Israel’s enemies invented and pinned on it. It is the word the Zionist movement used for its own institutions — on its letterhead, in its company registrations, in the name of its own bank — in the decades when the word carried no shame at all. They used it first. And one of them, a century ago, wrote two articles explaining exactly what it meant.
They Named It First
The Jewish Colonization Association was founded in London on 11 September 1891.⁶ Baron Maurice de Hirsch put up the money — two million pounds, something over three hundred million today — and the charter’s object was to help Jews leave the countries that were persecuting them and settle on land somewhere else. Argentina, mostly, at first. Palestine was one destination among several.
Eight years later the Zionist movement built its bank. The Jewish Colonial Trust was incorporated under the English Companies Acts on 20 March 1899, with its office in London and an authorised capital of two million pounds in one-pound shares, the same sum again.⁷ It was not a private venture that happened to be run by Zionists. Its governing council was drawn from the movement’s own executive, the Greater Actions Committee; one of its members had to report to every Zionist Congress; and its policy was set by Congress resolution. The First Congress at Basel had proposed the bank. The Second had voted it through. In German it was the Jüdische Colonialbank. The memorandum of association, still catalogued in the National Library of Israel, carries the name on its title page.⁸
In 1924 Edmond de Rothschild reorganised his Palestine holdings into a separate body and called it the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association. It kept that name until it wound itself up in 1957.⁹
Then there is Herzl. In January 1902 he drafted a letter to Cecil Rhodes — the diamond magnate and former prime minister of the Cape Colony, whose chartered company had crossed South Africa’s northern border, the Limpopo, and taken the Ndebele and Shona lands beyond it, now Zimbabwe, by fraud and then by Maxim gun, and named them after him, Rhodesia — asking him to put his authority behind the Zionist plan, and explained in the letter why he was writing to Rhodes of all people. Because, he wrote, the matter was “something colonial.”¹⁰
And then there is Jabotinsky.
Ze’ev Jabotinsky published “The Iron Wall” in the Russian-language weekly Rassvet on 4 November 1923.¹¹ It is the founding text of Revisionist Zionism, the tradition that runs through Begin and Shamir to the Likud governments of the present day, and the word it uses for the enterprise, from beginning to end, is colonisation. One of its section headings is “All Natives Resist Colonists.” Its argument is that no native population anywhere has ever consented to being settled by newcomers; that the Arabs of Palestine are not confused or bribable but are behaving exactly as any people behaves; and that the enterprise must therefore proceed behind a wall of force the native population cannot breach, until resistance looks hopeless. “Zionist colonisation must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population.”
That alone would do. But a week later, on 11 November, he published a second article in the same paper.¹² He called it “The Ethics of the Iron Wall,” and in it he asked the question straight. Is it moral to colonise a country against the wishes of its native population? He granted that by that standard colonisation in Uganda was immoral too, and so was colonisation anywhere. And then he argued his exception: that the soil “does not belong to those who possess land in excess but to those who do not possess any,” and the Jews possessed none.
Hold what that means. A man who thought colonisation was a neutral term — a word for farming, for draining marshes — does not need to write a second article defending its ethics. Jabotinsky knew exactly what the word meant, knew it carried a moral charge in 1923, accepted the charge, and argued the case anyway. He did not use the word by accident. He used it because it was the right word, and then he explained why the thing it named was justified in this one case.
Israel’s defenders will tell you none of this counts. The Hebrew names of these institutions contain no colonial word at all. The Jewish Colonial Trust’s Hebrew title, printed on the same memorandum as the English one, is Otzar Hityashvut ha-Yehudim — the Fund for the Settlement of the Jews. The Palestine Jewish Colonization Association in Hebrew is the Society for Jewish Settlement in the Land of Israel. Hityashvut is settlement; it comes from the verb to sit, to dwell. The colonial word was for the outside — for the Companies Registry in London, for the bankers in Berlin, for Rhodes — and the movement’s own language said settlement from the first day.¹³
And “colonisation” itself meant something broader then. Its Latin root is cultivation. Through the nineteenth century it described organised farming settlement — the Prussian programme in Posen, the Dutch reclaiming land from the sea — and it stayed a technical word until the 1960s, when it came to mean domination and the focus moved from the land to the people on it.¹⁴
All of that is true, and it proves the opposite of what it is meant to prove.
If colonisation in 1899 was innocent — a word for ploughing and draining, fit for a bank’s letterhead in London — then nobody in 1899 had any reason to avoid it. And nobody did. The defence that the word was harmless is the proof that the word was usable. What the defence cannot answer is what happened to it afterwards. Why did a word innocent enough to put on a bank in 1899 become a word that could not be spoken by 1967? Nothing about the Hebrew changed. Hityashvut is still hityashvut. What changed was what the world had learned, in the years between, about what organised agricultural settlement does to the people already living on the land.
The word became unsayable. The habit behind it — one thing said to the world, another said at home — did not, and it still runs in two languages; only the direction has turned round. In 1899 the plain word went outward, to London and Berlin, because the people who approved of the project were the ones who ran colonies — governments that would be glad to see their Jews leave for one. Herzl had written it in his diary in 1895: “The anti-Semites will become our most dependable friends, the anti-Semitic countries our allies.” The soft word stayed home, for the Jews, most of whom wanted nothing to do with it; the First Zionist Congress had to be moved from Munich to Basel in 1897 because the city’s rabbis, Orthodox and Reform alike, refused to have it. Now the plain version stays home. On 29 September 2025 Netanyahu stood beside Trump at the White House and, in English, backed a twenty-point plan whose text said “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza,” had the army “progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies,” and opened “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.” That night he posted a video for Israelis, in Hebrew. The army “will remain in most of the Gaza Strip” — pull it out? “No way, that’s not happening.” A Palestinian state: “not at all, and it is not written in the agreement.” Same man, same day, same plan. In English, withdrawal and a pathway to a state. In Hebrew, no withdrawal and no state. The language is picked for the audience, exactly as it was in 1899, and the reason the plain version moved indoors is the reason the word did: the world had learned what it meant.¹⁵
The Charge Against the Arab and Islamic Empires
Here is the charge, in the words of the people who make it. Islam conquered from Spain to the Indus inside a century. Arab armies took North Africa, the Levant and Persia; the Muslim dynasties that followed took Anatolia and pushed deep into India, and most of it is Muslim still. They settled where they conquered. They taxed the people they found. They made Arabic the language of government and Islam the faith of the majority in lands that had been Christian, Zoroastrian and Hindu for centuries before they came. Egypt was a Christian country. North Africa was Augustine’s. In Iran, the Arabs broke the Sasanian Empire, the last great Persian state, and made its people take a new alphabet and a new god. The Persians were the native people of their own land and the Arabs colonised them, and thirteen centuries later the colonisation is still in force, because the regime in Tehran rules in the name of the religion the conquerors brought. The Iranians are the indigenous people. Islam is the occupation. No empire took more land from more peoples and kept it longer. The Muslims are the greatest colonisers the world has seen, and a Muslim who accuses Israel of colonialism is either ignorant of his own history or lying about it — and if he singles out Israel, of all the colonial projects on earth, the thing he objects to is not the colonialism.
That is the charge, and the Iranian form of it is the one running hardest at the moment. The people who make it believe it. They forget that Christianity did the same to those lands first, and to Europe after.
The conquests happened. The Arab armies went out from the Hijaz in the 630s and within a hundred years held territory from the Pyrenees to the Indus. The Muslim histories say so first and say so proudly. Nobody is denying a yard of it.
But the charge is not that Muslims conquered. If it were, it would be true and beside the point, because conquest is not the accusation levelled at Israel. The charge is that what the Muslims did was colonialism — the same thing, in the sense that matters, as what Israel is doing now. The first is a fact. The second has to be shown.
The charge is doing three things at once.
The first is a claim about history: that the conquests of the seventh century and Israel’s illegal settlements of the twenty-first are the same kind of operation. That is answered by looking at what each one did.
The second is the oldest move in logic. You did it too. Grant the history in full and the move still establishes nothing about what is being done in the West Bank now. It never has, in any court or any argument, for anyone.
The third is the payload. It takes a question about land — who holds it, how they came to hold it, what was done with the people on it — and turns it into a question about the person asking. A Muslim who raises the subject is no longer arguing about territory. They are revealing a motive, and the motive has a name: the charge is built so that a Muslim who raises Israel’s illegal settlements can be called an antisemite for raising them. And for that to work they have to carry, because they pray in the same direction as the men who took Damascus in 635, the guilt for their taking it.
What Colonialism Is
Colonialism, to most people who use the word, means the British and French empires. It means India under the Raj, and the Gold Coast, and Senegal, and Indochina: a European power ruling an African or Asian population from a capital thousands of miles away, taxing it, conscripting it, staffing a civil service over it, shipping home what the territory produced.
That kind is real, and the British in India are the model of it. The Crown took India from the East India Company in 1858 and ruled it from London for eighty-nine years.¹⁶ The British did not want India empty. They wanted it working. Dadabhai Naoroji, who sat in the Commons for Central Finsbury in the 1890s, spent decades counting what left India every year — the taxes raised there and spent in Britain, the salaries and pensions paid in England, the interest on the debt, the bill for the army — and put it at thirty million pounds a year.¹⁷ The figure is argued over. That there was a drain is not. The British needed every Indian in place, because the Indians were what was being drained. And in 1947 they left, because there was a Britain to go back to.
The French ran the same operation across West Africa and Indochina. From 1887 the Code de l’indigénat — the native code, first written for Algeria in 1881 — put the people of Senegal, and in time the whole of French West Africa, under a law written for them alone: summary punishment by the district officer, forced labour, a head tax, conscription into the tirailleurs, the colonial infantry, and the courts of French-appointed chiefs rather than the courts of France.¹⁸ It was written to make them work.
Colonialism of this kind ran two laws on one ground, one for its own citizens and one for the people it ruled. In India a European could not be tried by an Indian magistrate, and when the government moved in 1883 to change that, the British in India forced a compromise that let any European demand a jury half of whom were Europeans.¹⁹ In West Africa it was the native code.
It brought in machinery built to carry the wealth out. India’s railways ran from the cotton and wheat districts to the ports, and in French Equatorial Africa the Congo–Ocean line was built by forced labour to link the river traffic of the interior to an Atlantic port.²⁰
It took what it wanted for its own collections in London, Paris or other European capitals. The Koh-i-Noor, one of the largest cut diamonds in the world, went from Lahore to Queen Victoria by treaty the year the Punjab was annexed, the bronzes of Benin went to London after British troops burned the city in 1897, and the stone that unlocked Egypt’s writing is in the British Museum.²¹
And it refused the people citizenship while demanding everything citizenship demands. They paid the taxes, worked the forced labour and filled the armies — more than a million Indians served in the First World War — and got no vote and no seat in the parliament that sent them. All the duties of a citizen, none of the rights.²²
But both the British and French empires ran a second kind of colonialism as well, and the second kind did not want the people at all.
In 1788 the British landed at Sydney Cove and took the continent as land that belonged to no one — terra nullius, the lawyers called it afterwards — though somewhere between three hundred thousand and a million people were living on it. They were not taxed or ruled or put to work. The land was given to settlers, the people were pushed off whatever ground the settlers wanted, and the first national count, in 1901, found 93,000 of them left.²³ It took the High Court of Australia until 1992 to rule that the land had belonged to someone after all.²⁴ The French did the same thing in Algeria from 1830.
The British and French empires ran two kinds of colonialism. The first needed the people where they were, and kept them working for the profit of the empire. The second needed the land, and got the people off it to make room for its own settlers.
Patrick Wolfe, an English-born historian who worked in Australia, spent his career on the second kind, and his account of it is the one historians use.²⁵ The people on the land, in that kind, are not a resource but an obstacle, and the point of the enterprise is to get them off the ground so the newcomers can have it. “Territoriality,” Wolfe wrote, “is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.” The natives are a problem because they “obstructed settlers’ access to land,” and the operation is built to solve that problem. “Settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.” Settler colonialism “destroys to replace.”
That last phrase has a precise meaning. Settler colonialism is “inherently eliminatory,” Wolfe wrote, but not “invariably genocidal.” Elimination is the larger category. It includes killing, and often it has meant killing; but it also includes removal, enclosure, assimilation, the breaking up of communities, the slow administrative erasure of a people from the land they were on. The native need not be dead. The native need only be gone — or so changed that there is no native left to make a claim.
The test: does the system need the people, or need them gone?
Three questions carry it. Who got the land — the conquerors, or the people who were already farming it? Were the conquered kept on as subjects, with a place in the new order, or were they moved aside? And the newcomers: did they come to rule the existing population, to extract from it, or to replace it?
None of that requires anyone to pretend that conquest is gentle. An empire can tax a people into the ground and still need them there. A settler project can be built by decent people with lawful deeds and still need them gone. The test is not about cruelty. It is about what the operation is for.
Wolfe did not build this test for Israel. He built it on Australia and the United States, where he did his work, and only then applied it to Palestine, in the same article — Israel’s “progressive dispensing with its reliance on Palestinian labour,” he wrote in 2006, “would seem to present an ominous case in point” — and six years later in a full study of its own.²⁶
Islamic Expansion Was Not Colonialism
Every empire conquered. Rome did, and Byzantium, and the Sasanians the Arabs destroyed, and Tang China, and the Mongols, and the Ottomans after them. Conquest is taking territory by force and ruling the people on it. If conquest were colonialism the word would mean nothing, because it would describe the whole of recorded history before 1945 and most of it after.
Conquest differs from colonialism in what it does with what it takes.
A conquest annexes. The land becomes part of the conqueror’s country and the people on it become its subjects. Gaul became Roman, and in 212 every free inhabitant of the empire became a Roman citizen.²⁷ A colony is possessed. Its people are kept outside the country that holds it, whatever the map says.
And the people stay, because subjects are what a conquest is for. A conquest takes a population along with the land: it pays the tax, works the fields, staffs the administration, fills the army. The conquered are ruled, sometimes harshly. They are not removed, because removing them would leave the conqueror with nothing to rule. The exceptions are remembered as exceptions — Assyria marching whole peoples into exile, the Mongols emptying cities — because they are the cases where a conqueror destroyed what conquest exists to acquire.
Now set the Arab conquests beside the two kinds of colony. The Arab armies took Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Persia by force and ruled the people they found there. But within thirty years the seat of the empire had left Arabia for Damascus, and a century after that it moved to Baghdad, a city built for the purpose in the conquered farmland of Iraq.²⁸ It never went back, and Syria and Iraq became the country. The people stayed, neither worked for a distant capital nor cleared off the land. The Arab conquests were neither kind of colony.
Nor did they run two laws on one ground the way a colony did. Under the caliphate the second law was the people’s own. Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians were judged in their own courts, by their own bishops, rabbis and priests, in their own marriages, inheritances and disputes. And they served in the state itself. Sarjun ibn Mansur, a Christian, ran the treasury of Syria for five Umayyad caliphs, and his son, John of Damascus, served at their court before he became a monk.
The protection reached past the Bible’s peoples. Umar took the jizya from the Zoroastrians because the Prophet had, and in Sindh after 712 the Hindus were brought under the same terms. It was a people governed by their own law, not by a law written over them.²⁹
The Raj and the Arab conquests both kept the people in place, so the difference between them is not that one taxed and the other did not. It is what each was built to do. The colony was built to carry a country’s wealth out of it and to keep the people it took it from outside. Macaulay’s minute of 1835 set out to form “a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect” — and those persons remained subjects of a country they could never join. The same minute held that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” The colony ranked people by blood and colour, and wrote the ranking into its law: the native could be taught English, but could never become British.
The Arab conquest ran the other way. Most of its revenue was spent where it was raised. Its government ran in Greek and Persian for two generations before it ran in Arabic.
And its religion was not pressed on the conquered but held open to them as a door: convert, and the jizya ended, and the convert stood inside the ruling community. The Umayyad governors fought that door, because every convert was a taxpayer lost, and the caliph Umar II overruled them. A colony has no such door. A Syrian who became a Muslim stood inside the faith of the conquerors, and by its law the equal of any Arab Muslim, wherever they were born. An Indian who became an Anglican remained a native.³⁰
Conquest and the settler kind of colonialism differ just as plainly. One needs the people where they are. The other needs them gone. So the question is not whether a people took land by force. It is what they did with the people who were already on it.
Put the three questions to the Arab conquests.
Who got the land?
Not the army that took it. When the Arab forces broke the Sasanians at Qadisiyya and took the farmland of southern Iraq — the sawad, the black land, the richest agricultural country in western Asia — the soldiers expected what conquering armies have always expected, which is a share. Umar, the second caliph, refused them. The land was not parcelled out. The cultivators who had farmed it under the Persians went on farming it under the Arabs; they paid a land tax, the kharaj, and the revenue went to the treasury and came back out as stipends for the soldiers.³¹ The army was paid from the surplus of a population it had been forbidden to displace. The same decision was made in Egypt, over the same objections, and the papyri bear it out: they show no Muslim owning land in Egypt before the middle of the eighth century, more than a hundred years after the conquest.³²
That is a fiscal fact before it is a moral one. A tax base cannot be expelled. The whole architecture of the early caliphate — the stipend rolls, the garrison pay, the provincial treasuries — depended on the conquered staying exactly where they were and doing exactly what they had been doing.
Were they kept on as subjects?
The cities that surrendered got terms, and the terms survive. Damascus set the pattern for Syria: the people kept their lives, their property and their churches, and in return they paid a poll tax.³³ Jerusalem’s assurance, in the form historians accept as resting on a genuine original, guaranteed persons, property, churches and crosses, and barred Muslims from inhabiting the churches or pulling them down.³⁴ The restrictive rules that later generations would attach to non-Muslims — the dress codes, the ban on building new places of worship, the deference on the road — are not in these agreements. They belong to a later century, when the Muslims had become a settled ruling class and had begun to legislate like one. The surrender terms of the conquest itself asked for one thing: the tax.³⁵
The legal status that grew out of those terms was the dhimma — the word means protection — and it was a contract. The non-Muslim paid the jizya; in return the state guaranteed their safety, their property and their freedom to worship, their own courts for their own community’s affairs, and exemption from the military service that Muslims owed. It was not a Muslim’s standing, and it was not meant to be. The Muslim paid the zakat and owed the state military service; the dhimmi paid the jizya and owed neither. Different obligations, under separate law, in a self-governing community living under the protection of the state. It was abused, and the abuses are documented. But every abuse was a breach of the contract, chargeable in the contract’s own terms — and the contract presupposed, in every clause, that the person it protected was still there.³⁶
Then there are the garrison cities, which the charge points to as settlement.
Kufa and Basra in Iraq, Fustat in Egypt, where old Cairo stands now, and Qayrawan in what is now Tunisia: the Arabs built new towns and lived in them, apart from the people they ruled. These were the bases of a conquering army, and the men in them were a stipendiary elite drawing cash from the agricultural surplus of a subject population that worked land the soldiers did not own.³⁷ The sources give the reasons as military: forward bases for the next campaign, somewhere to house the troops and their families. They never give the reason as a policy of keeping conquerors and conquered apart. But apart is what they were. The first garrison of Basra complained that they had no farmland. That grievance is the best evidence there is of what the system was for, because nobody complains about a restriction that does not exist.³⁸
So: a garrison, living on the tax of the countryside, kept off the land. Not a settler colony. The settlers of a settler colony hold the land; that is the whole point of them. These men were kept off it.
Persia is the case the charge leans on hardest.
The Sasanian state was destroyed. The Persian people were not. They stayed on their land and converted slowly — the best estimate is that Iran was not eighty per cent Muslim until around 950, three centuries after the conquest.³⁹ They kept their language. Persian survived, came back into writing in Arabic script, and by 1010 had produced the Shahnameh, the national epic of Persian kings and heroes, written by a Muslim poet.⁴⁰ Persians ran the Abbasid administration from the eighth century on; Persian became the second language of the whole civilisation, the language of its poetry and much of its science. The Iranians of today are the descendants of the Iranians the Arabs found. That is not the history of a people replaced. It is the history of a people conquered, converted, and then running the civilisation that had conquered them.
As for the claim that a religion adopted thirteen hundred years ago is a foreign occupation still in force — it proves too much. By that logic Christianity is a Levantine occupation of Europe, and every church in Rome is a settlement.
Put the three questions to the conquests, then. The land stayed with the people who farmed it. The conquered were kept on as subjects, taxed and protected under terms that assumed their presence. The newcomers came to rule, and were kept from seizing the land and exploiting it and its people — the two things a colony comes for. The conquest needed the conquered where they were. It taxed them. It did not clear them.
The conquered population was a governed population — not an obstacle to be removed from the land, and not a people exploited for a distant capital.
The Rule and the Exceptions
The charge shows you the empire on a map. It never shows you who was still living on the land when the empire was gone.
The Arab conquests and the Muslim empires that followed them held, at one time or another, Spain, the whole of North Africa, Egypt, the Levant, Iraq, Persia, Central Asia, Anatolia, the Balkans and most of India. Thirteen centuries. Three continents. And across all of it the rule was the one the sawad set in the 630s: the people stayed, and were ruled, and were taxed. The Copts of Egypt; the people of Syria and Iraq, Christian and then Muslim; the Persians; the Berbers of the Maghreb, Arabised in speech and not replaced in blood;⁴¹ the Spaniards after up to eight centuries of Muslim rule; the Hindus of India after six, still the great majority of their country when the last Muslim dynasty fell — all of them are where they were. That is not what a colonising power leaves behind. It is what an empire leaves behind: the same people, speaking differently, praying differently, and still on their land.
Arabisation and Islamisation ran deep. They were not population replacement.
Against that stand the cases the charge reaches for.
Anatolia is the largest. In 1050 it was Greek-speaking and Christian; by 1500 it was Turkish-speaking and Muslim. It was taken not by the Arabs but by the Seljuks and then the Ottomans, four centuries after the conquests, and what happened there was conversion under pressure, not replacement: Seljuk and Turkmen armies broke the Byzantine administration and the Church that depended on it, and conversion followed as the old order fell away.⁴² The modern Turkish population carries a Central Asian genetic contribution of under ten per cent; the other ninety came from somewhere, and it was Anatolia.⁴³ The Ottomans also took Christian children by levy — the devshirme — from Anatolian villages as well as Balkan ones.⁴⁴ And the end of Anatolian Christianity was not conversion at all. Between 1915 and 1923 the Armenians were destroyed — somewhere between six hundred thousand and a million and a half of them killed by the Ottoman government — and the Greeks were driven out, the last of them under the exchange agreed at Lausanne in 1923.⁴⁵ It was the work of a nationalist party ruling in the sultan’s name, and it is the one episode in thirteen centuries that was elimination on the scale of a whole people. It was carried out by the thing that replaced Islamic empire, not by Islamic empire.
The earliest is the smallest. In the 640s Umar moved the Jews of Khaybar and the Christians of Najran out of Arabia, and the sources give more than one reason for each.
Khaybar had been taken in 628. The Prophet let its Jewish farmers stay on the land for half the harvest, on terms that could be ended whenever the Muslims chose: “as long as we wish.” Under Umar, his son Abdullah was attacked there at night and his hands and feet were dislocated. The attacker was never named. Umar said the Jews of Khaybar were the only people there he suspected, and ended the terms.
Najran held a treaty with the Prophet that secured its Christians’ persons, religion, lands and churches, and bound them to take no usury. Al-Baladhuri says that under Umar they took it up again and grew so numerous that he counted them a danger to the faith. He also records that the Najranites, quarrelling among themselves, asked to be moved.
Behind both cases stands an instruction Umar himself reported from the Prophet: “I will expel the Jews and Christians from the Arabian Peninsula.” That instruction was a rule for Arabia, the heartland of the faith, and was never applied to Syria, Iraq, Egypt or Persia, where Jews and Christians lived under Muslim rule for thirteen centuries.
Neither community was left with nothing. Umar ordered that the people of Najran be given tillable land in Syria and Iraq in place of what they had left, and one report says he bought their property.⁴⁶
Two communities, one region, resettled rather than destroyed. But they were populations moved off their land by the caliphate in its first decade.
Qayrawan, 1057: Arab tribes moving west into what is now Tunisia sacked the city that had been the centre of learning for Muslim North Africa for nearly four centuries. Its victims were Muslims.⁴⁷ India: Richard Eaton, the historian who has done the counting, documents around eighty episodes between 1192 and 1729 in which Muslim rulers and their commanders desecrated Hindu temples — the acts of kings and generals along the frontier of conquest, aimed at the temples that housed a defeated ruler’s deity and so his claim to rule, some of them campaigns against whole cities.⁴⁸ The counts in the tens of thousands that circulate in Indian politics are supported by nothing; the eighty are. And in 1679 Aurangzeb reimposed the jizya on his Hindu subjects, which Akbar had abolished in 1564.⁴⁹
One province in the first decade, one region, one city, one tax, eighty episodes in five hundred years. Set them against thirteen centuries in which the conquered stayed, and they are what they are: the exceptions.
None of it makes the conquests colonialism, because colonialism was never a matter of how much harm an empire did. Rome did harm. Byzantium did harm. The Sasanians did harm, and the Mongols, and the Ottomans, and every power that ever held territory by force. A record of conquest, subordination and atrocity makes an empire an empire. It does not make it a settler colony, and pointing at the record as though it did is pointing at the wrong charge. The conquests did harm. That is true. That they were colonialism is a different claim, and it is the one the mayor of Mitzpe Yeriho needs. The record does not supply it.
Israeli Settler Colonialism
Now put the same test to Israel.
Since June 1967 the State of Israel has moved hundreds of thousands of its own citizens into the territory it occupied that month, and it has done so as policy. Land is taken into state control — declared state land, requisitioned for military need, closed as a firing zone or a nature reserve — and once taken it is closed to the Palestinians who were farming it and opened to Israelis who were not.⁵⁰ The people who move in do not move in on their own. They are planned for, zoned for, subsidised, connected to the grid and the water and the roads, and guarded by the army. The roads are the system in miniature: one network for the illegal settlements, fast and fenced, and another for the Palestinian towns between them, with the checkpoints on the second.⁵¹ Two populations live on the same hills under two bodies of law. The illegal settler is an Israeli citizen under Israeli civil law. Their Palestinian neighbour is a protected person under military order, tried in a military court — and the Court at The Hague found in 2024 that the difference is not incidental. It amounts to segregation, and the Court said so in the language of the convention that prohibits it.⁵²
At the edges, where the map is still being drawn, illegal settlers clear the land themselves, with guns, clubs and fire. In 2025 the United Nations recorded more than 1,800 attacks by settlers on Palestinians in the West Bank, the highest annual figure it has ever logged.⁵³ The army protects the illegal settlers while they do it. The outposts go up where the families came out.
This system does not need the people. It needs the land they are standing on.
Then the number the whole operation turns on.
Between November 1947 and the end of the war in 1949, more than seven hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs left or were driven from the territory that became Israel, and none of them were permitted to return. The figure is not in serious dispute. The United Nations’ own technical committee, counting on the ground in August 1949, put it at 711,000.⁵⁴ Benny Morris, the Israeli historian whose archival work the field rests on, gives a range of 600,000 to 760,000.⁵⁵ The argument among historians is not about how many. It is about why — about orders and intentions, about who expelled whom and who fled from what — and that argument is real. But three-quarters of a million people were removed from the land and not allowed home, and nobody on any side of the dispute has ever shown otherwise.
About a hundred and fifty thousand stayed, and became citizens of the new state, which kept them under military government until 1966.⁵⁶ A fifth of Israel’s citizens today are their descendants, and they are offered, in every argument about colonialism, racism and apartheid, as the proof that Israel is none of those. They are the fraction the war did not remove, and the state has written down what they are to it. In 2018 the Knesset passed a Basic Law — constitutional law, in a country with no constitution — declaring that the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel “is exclusive to the Jewish People”, reducing Arabic from an official language to one with “a special status”, and naming Jewish settlement “a national value” the state “shall act to encourage and promote”. Citizens of a country that has said, in law, that national self-determination in it is not theirs. That is a colony’s people — kept outside the country that took the land, whatever the map says — in the state’s own hand. Four in every five were gone. The fifth that stayed is kept, and put to use.
Put the three questions to this.
Who got the land? The state, and then the settlers. Were the people kept on as subjects? Seven hundred thousand were not kept at all, and the ones who remained live under a separate law. And the newcomers: they did not come to rule the Palestinians or to extract from them. Israel has spent decades reducing its dependence on Palestinian labour, not deepening it. They came for the land.
One thing separates the two operations, and it is the one that matters: what was done with the people. The conquest kept them and governed them under their own law. Settler colonialism takes the land and moves them off it.
Algeria Was France
Israel’s defenders say it cannot be colonialism because it does not look like British India: no far-off capital ruling it, no mother country draining its wealth, nobody waiting to sail home. They are describing the first kind of colony. Israel is the second kind, and the French built the textbook case of it.
Its defenders say something else as well: that Israel made the desert bloom, that it found a neglected land and brought it farms, roads and industry. Every colony has said that. France said it of Algeria; Jules Ferry told the Chamber of Deputies in 1885 that “the higher races have a right over the lower races,” because they have “the duty to civilise” them. And the land was not waiting for anyone to farm it. The Jaffa orange was bred by Arab growers near Jaffa in the middle of the nineteenth century and was already being shipped abroad in the millions before the first Zionist settlers arrived in 1882.⁵⁷
In 1830 France landed an army at Sidi Ferruch and took Algiers.⁵⁸ What followed was not India. France did not rule Algeria from Paris through a native administration. It filled Algeria with French people. In 1848 the Second Republic wrote into its constitution that the territory of Algeria was French territory, and organised the settled north into three French departments — Alger, Oran, Constantine.⁵⁹ Algeria was France. Its settlers elected mayors and deputies and sent the deputies to the National Assembly. And the Muslims who were the overwhelming majority of its population were French nationals but not French citizens: they could not vote for the councils that governed them, they could not be mayor, their seats on local bodies were appointed and capped at a third, and they had no seat in the Assembly until 1945.⁶⁰ To become a citizen a Muslim had to renounce their personal status — their right to their own courts in marriage, inheritance and family — and in the seventy years after the law of 1865 made that offer, barely two and a half thousand took it.⁶¹ In 1870 France granted citizenship to Algeria’s forty thousand Jews, collectively, by decree. It did not grant it to the Muslims.⁶²
So the map said France and the law said otherwise. Annexation on paper did not make Algeria a conquest, because the test of a conquest is not the colour of the map. It is whether the people on the land join the country that took it. Nine million Algerians never did. A million French did, and got the land.
Two populations on the same ground. One with the vote, one without. One under civil law, one under a legal status written for it alone. Land taken from the second and given to the first — Algeria’s best farmland passed into European hands over the course of the century by confiscation, by sequestration after each revolt, and by purchase. By the census of 1960 the Europeans numbered about a million, a tenth of the population, and held the country.⁶³
And when the Muslims fought, from 1954, the army moved them. Between 1955 and 1962 the French forces cleared the countryside of the war zones village by village and held the people in regroupment centres behind wire — more than two million of them, a quarter of the Muslim population, by the French geographers’ own count.⁶⁴ The army called it security. It was a quarter of a people taken off their land. Whatever else the system wanted from those people, when it came to it, it wanted the ground more.
That is the settler colony, and the historians of settler colonialism treat French Algeria as a textbook case. The standard handbook on the subject gives it a chapter, in the same volume that gives two to Palestine.⁶⁵
The resemblance is not an analogy drawn after the fact. The men who built the Zionist settlements looked at Algeria first. The philanthropists who funded the first Jewish agricultural colonies in Palestine in the 1880s and 1890s wanted what the French had in Algeria: a Jewish planter class living on cheap Arab labour. It was a younger and harder generation of settlers, in the early 1900s, who concluded that it would not work — that without a metropole’s power behind them a mixed workforce would doom the enterprise — and who built instead a closed Jewish economy that employed only Jews. The Conquest of Labour, they called it.⁶⁶ Algeria was the settler colony that still ran on the natives’ labour; the Zionists built one that did not. Algeria was not a resemblance that critics noticed later. It was a blueprint the settlers studied and set aside, and what they built in its place was more exclusive than the thing they had rejected.
Algeria became independent on 5 July 1962, a hundred and thirty-two years to the day after the Dey of Algiers surrendered. In the months either side of it, about eight hundred thousand European settlers and their descendants left — the pieds-noirs, the French of Algeria — and they went to France, because France existed and received them.⁶⁷
The Wrong Charge
The conquests were not colonialism, and the record shows it. But take every claim the charge points to as true. What follows about an illegal settlement above Jericho in 2026?
Nothing.
You did it too is not a defence. It has never been one — not in a magistrates’ court, not at The Hague, not in any system of law or argument that has ever existed. Someone charged with taking a neighbour’s field does not answer the charge by naming the fields the neighbour’s great-grandfather took. They answer it by showing that they did not take the field, or that the field was theirs. The charge against Israel is that it is taking the land and removing the people. The record of the Umayyads, true or false, gentle or savage, has nothing to say about whether that is happening in the hills above Jericho now. The mayor lives there.
And the people the charge is aimed at are not the Umayyads. They are the farmers of Masafer Yatta, in the South Hebron hills, whose villages Israel declared a firing range in the 1980s and whose eviction its Supreme Court cleared in May 2022 — and who are told, when they say the word colonialism, that they have no standing to say it because of what Damascus did in 635.⁶⁸ They were not at Damascus. They are not answerable for it.
Nobody on earth is answerable for what was done by people who shared their religion thirteen centuries before they were born, and nobody who makes that argument applies it to themselves. By its logic, every Jew alive would answer for the conquest of Canaan, which the Book of Joshua tells as the destruction of the peoples of the land: “he left none remaining, but utterly destroyed all that breathed.”⁶⁹ No one says that, and no one should. A principle that runs in one direction only is not a principle. It is a weapon.
That is what the charge is for. It is not a claim about history. It is a way of making Muslims who say the word carry a guilt they did not earn, so that the word cannot be said — and of calling them antisemites if they say it anyway. It is built to end the conversation, not to win it.
The conquests were a different operation. They took territory by force and ruled the people who were on it — governing them under their own law, and leaving them in place. What Israel is doing takes the land and removes most of the people. The Arabs who remained live under a law that makes Israel the homeland of Jews alone: citizens on paper, foreigners in their own land. It is a different operation with a different end.
Egypt is still full of Egyptians. Palestine’s three-quarters of a million were removed and never allowed home, and its land is taken by force every day.
Working notes and primary sources on Telegram.
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Banner: Share certificate of the Jewish Colonial Trust (Juedische Colonialbank), Vienna, 1912. Jewish Museum Vienna, Inv. Nr. 974. CC0.
James S. Coates writes about geopolitics, international law, and the decline of civilisational accountability. His books include A Signal Through Time, The Threshold, The Road to Khurasan, the memoir God and Country (published under pen name Will Prentiss) and his forthcoming Neither Gods Nor Monsters. He publishes regularly on Fireline Press and The Signal Dispatch, and his academic work appears on PhilPapers. He lives in the UK, with his family and dog who has no interest in any of this.
© 2026 James S. Coates All Rights Reserved. Fireline Press · fireline.press
Endnotes
¹ Aliza Pilichowski, “Arabs, not Jews, are the real colonizers in the Middle East,” Jerusalem Post, 13 July 2026, opinion (paywalled); the byline gives the author’s positions.
² UN OCHA, Humanitarian Atlas 2019, Israeli settlements table (data: Peace Now), “Mizpe Yericho,” established 1978, Jericho governorate. Some sources give first settlement in October 1977.
³ Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Characterization and Classification of Geographical Units by the Socio-Economic Level of the Population, 2019, Table 7, locality code 3576, population 2,560.
⁴ ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, para 87, on the status of the territories as occupied, and para 119, on the transfer of settlers as contrary to Article 49(6).
⁵ Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949; Israel signed 8 December 1949 and ratified 6 July 1951, in force for Israel 6 January 1952 — UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Question of the Observance of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 in Gaza and the West Bank including Jerusalem (New York, 1979), table of ratifications.
⁶ “Jewish Colonization Association,” The Jewish Encyclopedia (1906), on the founding of 11 September 1891, the capital of £2,000,000 and the charter’s objects (£2,000,000 in 1891 is roughly £330 million in 2026 by the ONS composite price index; the 1899 figure converts the same); Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd ed. (2007), “Jewish Colonization Association (ICA),” on the Argentine colonies.
⁷ “Jewish Colonial Trust, The (Jüdische Colonialbank),” The Jewish Encyclopedia (1906): incorporation under the Companies Acts on 20 March 1899, authorised capital £2,000,000, council drawn from the Greater Actions Committee and reporting to each Congress.
⁸ Otzar Hityashvuth Hayehudim, Jewish Colonial Trust Limited: memorandum and articles of association, registered 20th March, 1899 (London: A. M. Oppenheimer, 1899), National Library of Israel, system no. 990022351840205171.
⁹ The Rothschild Archive, “Edmond James de Rothschild (1845–1934),” on the reorganisation of the Palestine colonies into PICA; Michael R. Fischbach, Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 162–64, on the dissolution of 1957 and the transfer of its land.
¹⁰ Theodor Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, ed. Raphael Patai, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Herzl Press and Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), draft letter to Cecil Rhodes, entry of 11 January 1902; vol. 1, entry of 12 June 1895, on the anti-Semites as “our most dependable friends.”
¹¹ Vladimir Jabotinsky, “O zheleznoi stene” [”The Iron Wall”], Rassvet, 4 November 1923; English text at the Jabotinsky Institute (archive ref. F-1923/204/EN) and the Jewish Virtual Library, both rendering the Russian kolonizatsia as “colonisation.” On the doctrine’s afterlife, Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Penguin, 2015 [2000]).
¹² Vladimir Jabotinsky, “The Ethics of the Iron Wall,” Rassvet, 11 November 1923; English in The Jewish Standard (London), 5 September 1941, p. 5.
¹³ The Hebrew title appears on the 1899 memorandum at note 8; for PICA, the Hebrew form as recorded in the VIAF authority file, no. 125672139.
¹⁴ Liesbeth van de Grift, “Introduction: Theories and Practices of Internal Colonization: The Cultivation of Lands and People in the Age of Modern Territoriality,” International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity 3, no. 2 (2015), 139–58, on the term’s agricultural sense and its shift in the 1960s.
¹⁵ Jewish Virtual Library, “First Zionist Congress and Basel Program (1897),” on the move from Munich to Basel over the opposition of the city’s Orthodox and Reform leadership; The White House, President Donald J. Trump’s Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, 29 September 2025, points 16 and 19; Washington Post, 30 September 2025, on Netanyahu’s Hebrew-language video of 29 September for the Israeli audience.
¹⁶ Government of India Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106), 2 August 1858, transferring the government of India to the Crown; Indian Independence Act 1947, in force 15 August 1947.
¹⁷ Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1901), on the drain and its channels; Martin Daunton, “Who Benefited from the British Empire?”, Gresham College lecture, 4 April 2023, on the figure of about £30 million a year as Naoroji’s and on the drain as not seriously denied.
¹⁸ Loi du 28 juin 1881 (Algeria), extended to Senegal by decree in 1887 and to French West Africa in 1904; Gregory Mann, “What Was the Indigénat? The ‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa,” Journal of African History 50, no. 3 (2009), 331–353, on summary punishment, forced labour, the head tax and the two-tier courts.
¹⁹ “Ilbert Bill,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, on the 1873 exemption of British subjects from trial by Indian magistrates, the bill of 1883, and the compromise of 1884 allowing a British subject to claim a jury half European.
²⁰ Daniel Thorner, “Great Britain and the Development of India’s Railways,” Journal of Economic History 11, no. 4 (1951), 389–402, on the lines built from the producing districts to the ports; J. P. Daughton, In the Forest of No Joy: The Congo-Océan Railroad and the Tragedy of French Colonialism (New York: W. W. Norton, 2021), on its construction by forced labour, 1921–1934.
²¹ Treaty of Lahore, 29 March 1849, Article III, on the surrender of the Koh-i-Noor to the Queen; Dan Hicks, The Brutish Museums: The Benin Bronzes, Colonial Violence and Cultural Restitution (London: Pluto Press, 2020), on the burning and looting of Benin City in February 1897; Capitulation of Alexandria, 2 September 1801, Article 16, on the transfer of the French collections, the Rosetta Stone among them.
²² Daunton (2023), as at note 17, on the 1.2 million Indian soldiers of the First World War.
²³ Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 2005, “Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population,” on the pre-1788 estimates (a minimum of 315,000; others above one million) and the 1901 count of 93,333.
²⁴ Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1, 3 June 1992, by six to one, rejecting the doctrine of terra nullius and recognising native title.
²⁵ Patrick Wolfe, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (December 2006), 387–409: “inherently eliminatory” and “not invariably genocidal” at 387; “territoriality,” “obstructed settlers’ access to land,” “a structure not an event” and “destroys to replace” at 388. The Australian work: Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology (London: Cassell, 1999).
²⁶ Wolfe (2006), 403, on Israel’s dispensing with Palestinian labour; Patrick Wolfe, “Purchase by Other Means: The Palestine Nakba and Zionism’s Conquest of Economics,” Settler Colonial Studies 2, no. 1 (2012), 133–168.
²⁷ Digest 1.5.17 (Ulpian), on the grant of Roman citizenship to all in the Roman world by the constitution of Antoninus (the Constitutio Antoniniana, 212).
²⁸ Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2016), on Mu’awiya’s establishment of the capital at Damascus in 661 and al-Mansur’s founding of Baghdad in 762.
²⁹ al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh al-Buldan, trans. Philip K. Hitti, The Origins of the Islamic State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916), and Sidney H. Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), on Sarjun ibn Mansur and the Syrian fiscal administration under the Umayyads; Sunan Abi Dawud 3043, on Umar’s taking of the jizya from the Magians on the Prophet’s precedent at Hajar; Yohanan Friedmann, “The Temple of Multan: A Note on Early Muslim Attitudes to Idolatry,” Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972), 176–182, on the status of dhimmi accorded to Hindus in Sindh.
³⁰ T. B. Macaulay, Minute on Indian Education, 2 February 1835; Qur’an 49:13; al-Tabari, Tarikh, on the Umayyad governors’ re-imposition of the jizya on converts and Umar II’s order exempting them; al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-Buldan, trans. Hitti (1916), as at note 29, on the transfer of the diwans of Syria and Iraq from Greek and Persian into Arabic.
³¹ Hugh Kennedy, “The Feeding of the Five Hundred Thousand: Cities and Agriculture in Early Islamic Mesopotamia,” Iraq 73 (2011), 177–199, on the decision not to distribute the sawad and the payment of stipends from its revenue; al-Baladhuri, as at note 29, Part IX, on the conquest of the sawad.
³² Alon Dar, “’…So that the Descendants of the Descendants [of the Muslims] May Profit by It’: ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the Muslim Army and the Decision not to Divide the Lands of Alexandria,” in Living the End of Antiquity: Individual Histories from Byzantine to Islamic Egypt (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 49–62, on the Egyptian decision and the absence of Muslim landholding from the papyri before the mid-eighth century.
³³ Ibrahim Zein and Ahmed El-Wakil, “Khālid b. al-Walīd’s Treaty with the People of Damascus: Identifying the Source Document through Shared and Competing Historical Memories,” Journal of Islamic Studies 31, no. 3 (2020), 295–328, on the Damascus terms as the template for Greater Syria.
³⁴ Milka Levy-Rubin, “Were the Jews Prohibited from Settling in Jerusalem Following the Arab Conquest? The Authenticity of al-Ṭabarī’s Jerusalem Surrender Agreement,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 36 (2009), 63–82, on the terms and on the text as resting on an authentic original.
³⁵ Milka Levy-Rubin, Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), on the absence of the later restrictions from the surrender agreements; Luke Yarbrough, “The Early Circulation and Late Adoption of the ‘Pact of ʿUmar’ (Shurūṭ ʿUmar),” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 53 (2022), on the eighth-century origin and late enforcement of the restrictive code.
³⁶ James S. Coates, “Jews in History: Who Protected Whom,” Fireline Press, 2026, on the dhimma as contract and on its abuses; Mark R. Cohen, Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
³⁷ Robert Hillenbrand, “Anjar and Early Islamic Urbanism,” in G. P. Brogiolo and B. Ward-Perkins, eds., The Idea and Ideal of the Town between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 59–98, at 92, on the garrison cities as military foundations; Petra Sijpesteijn, “Miṣr,” The Oxford Dictionary of Late Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), on new foundations in Iraq, Egypt and North Africa against settlement in existing cities in Syria.
³⁸ Kennedy (2011), on the military rationale for the foundations and on the Basra settlers’ complaint of having no farmland; Fred M. Donner, “Basra,” Encyclopaedia Iranica III/8, 851–855.
³⁹ Elton L. Daniel, “Conversion ii. Of Iranians to Islam,” Encyclopaedia Iranica VI/3 (1993), 229–232, reporting Richard Bulliet’s estimate of eighty per cent or more by about 950; Richard W. Bulliet, Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period: An Essay in Quantitative History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
⁴⁰ “Šāh-nāma,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, on the completion of Ferdowsi’s epic in 1010.
⁴¹ Lara R. Arauna et al., “Recent Historical Migrations Have Shaped the Gene Pool of Arabs and Berbers in North Africa,” Molecular Biology and Evolution 34, no. 2 (2017), 318–329, finding no genome-wide distinction between self-identified Arabs and Berbers.
⁴² Speros Vryonis Jr., The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
⁴³ M. Ece Kars et al., “The genetic structure of the Turkish population reveals high levels of variation and admixture,” PNAS 118, no. 36 (2021), e2026076118, giving a Central Asian autosomal contribution of 9.59 per cent.
⁴⁴ Gülay Yılmaz, “The Devshirme System and the Levied Children of Bursa in 1603–4,” Belleten 79, no. 286 (2015), on the levy of Anatolian Christian villages.
⁴⁵ Raymond Kévorkian, The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Lausanne, 30 January 1923, Article 1, defining the exchange by religion; Husniye Merve Bingol Turkan, “A Systematic Review of the Political, Social, and Cultural Legacies of the 1923 Greek–Turkish Population Exchange,” Genealogy 10, no. 2 (2026), art. 41, on the Karamanli and Cretan cases.
⁴⁶ al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh al-Buldan, trans. Hitti (1916), as at note 29, chapter on Najran, on the treaty’s guarantees and its condition “that they neither take nor give usury,” the competing accounts of the expulsion, the order to clear tillable land for them in Syria and Iraq, and the report of the purchase of their properties; Sahih al-Bukhari 2338, on the Khaybar tenancy “as long as we wish,” and 2730, on the attack on Abdullah ibn Umar and Umar’s stated reason; Sahih Muslim 1767a, narrated by Umar, on the instruction concerning the Arabian Peninsula.
⁴⁷ Matt King, Dynasties Intertwined: The Zirids of Ifriqiya and the Normans of Sicily (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022); Amar S. Baadj, Saladin, the Almohads and the Banū Ghāniya: The Contest for North Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2015), on the sack of 1057.
⁴⁸ Richard M. Eaton, “Temple Desecration and Indo-Muslim States,” Journal of Islamic Studies 11, no. 3 (2000), 283–319.
⁴⁹ Satish Chandra, “Jizyah and the State in India during the 17th Century,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 12, no. 1 (1969), 322–340, on the reimposition of 1679.
⁵⁰ ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, para 122, on the confiscation and requisition of land as contrary to the Hague Regulations; James S. Coates, “The October War, Part II,” Fireline Press, 1 September 2026, on state-land declaration, requisition and closure.
⁵¹ B’Tselem, Forbidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank (Jerusalem, August 2004).
⁵² ICJ, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, on the breach of Article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Coates, “The October War, Part II,” on the two legal systems.
⁵³ UN OCHA, Reported impact since 7 October 2023 — West Bank, data tracker, 2025 total of settler attacks resulting in casualties or property damage; UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, report of 9 June 2026, finding that Israeli forces “regularly accompanied settlers and provided cover for the violence”; Coates, “The October War, Part II.”
⁵⁴ UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Report of the Technical Committee on Refugees, A/AC.25/Com.Tech/9, Lausanne, 19 August 1949, on the 711,000 figure.
⁵⁵ Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1, on the range of 600,000 to 760,000.
⁵⁶ Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Registration of Population, 8 November 1948, on the roughly 156,000 Arabs counted inside the armistice lines; Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel’s Liberal Settler State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), on citizenship and the military government of 1948–1966; Basic Law: Israel – The Nation State of the Jewish People, 19 July 2018, Articles 1(c), 4 and 7, Knesset English text.
⁵⁷ Jules Ferry, speech to the Chamber of Deputies, 28 July 1885, Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires; Mustafa Kabha and Nahum Karlinsky, The Lost Orchard: The Palestinian-Arab Citrus Industry, 1850–1950 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2021), on the Arab development and export of the Jaffa orange before Zionist settlement.
⁵⁸ John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), on the landing at Sidi Ferruch, 14 June 1830, and the surrender of Algiers, 5 July 1830.
⁵⁹ Constitution of the French Republic, 4 November 1848, declaring the territory of Algeria French territory; Ruedy (2005), on the three departments.
⁶⁰ Ruedy (2005), on municipal representation and the exclusion of Muslims from the National Assembly before 1945; Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830–2000: A Short History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
⁶¹ Sénatus-consulte of 14 July 1865, on the status of Muslims as French nationals; Ruedy (2005), and the archival count of 2,396 naturalisations under the sénatus-consulte between 1865 and 1915.
⁶² Décret Crémieux, 24 October 1870.
⁶³ Bernard A. Cook, Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 2001), 398, on the census of 1 June 1960; Kamel Kateb, Européens, “indigènes” et Juifs en Algérie (1830–1962) (Paris: INED, 2001); Ruedy (2005), on the transfer of land to European hands.
⁶⁴ Michel Cornaton, Les regroupements de la décolonisation en Algérie (Paris: Éditions ouvrières, 1967), on 2,350,000 people moved by armed force; Marc Lesne, “Une expérience de déplacement de population: les centres de regroupement en Algérie,” Annales de géographie 71, no. 388 (1962), on a quarter of the Muslim population living in the centres; Fabien Sacriste, Les camps de regroupement en Algérie: une histoire des déplacements forcés (1954–1962) (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2022).
⁶⁵ “French Algeria, 1830–1962,” in Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini, eds., The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism (London: Routledge, 2017), ch. 14; the Palestine chapters at chs. 23–24.
⁶⁶ Lorenzo Veracini, “Settler Colonialism in the Middle East and North Africa: A Protracted History,” Middle East Report (MERIP), 11 May 2022, on the Algerian model and its rejection; on the Conquest of Labour, Wolfe, “Purchase by Other Means” (2012), as at note 26.
⁶⁷ Jean-Jacques Jordi, “1962: the French exodus from Algeria,” Chemins de mémoire (Ministère des Armées), on the eight hundred thousand departures of 1962.
⁶⁸ UN OCHA, Fact sheet: Masafer Yatta communities at risk of forcible transfer, June 2022 (published 6 July 2022), on Firing Zone 918 and the High Court ruling of 4 May 2022.
⁶⁹ Joshua 10:40 (King James Version); see also Joshua 6:21, on Jericho.

Excellent, excellent!
Very thorough!