Just for Fun: The War in Iran, Part I
A two-part series examining the illegality of the US-Israeli war on Iran
On the fifteenth of March 2026, the President of the United States told NBC News that American forces had bombed Kharg Island — the terminal through which ninety percent of Iran’s oil exports flow, the economic lifeline of a nation of more than ninety million people — and that “we may hit it a few more times just for fun.”¹
Just for fun.
Thirteen American service members are dead.² Six of them — reservists from Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, Florida, California — were killed on the first of March when an Iranian drone struck a makeshift operations centre at Port Shuaiba in Kuwait.³ They were not combat troops storming a beachhead. They were logistics personnel, sustainment soldiers, the people who keep the machinery running. Four of them had served together in Kuwait in 2019. They knew each other’s families.⁴ Captain Cody Khork, thirty-five, from Winter Haven, Florida — his family called him “the life of the party.” Sergeant First Class Noah Tietjens, forty-two, from Bellevue, Nebraska — a mentor who “made you feel important,” whose twelve-year-old son is now growing up without a father. Sergeant Declan Coady, twenty, from West Des Moines — the youngest, promoted posthumously to a rank he will never wear, studying cybersecurity at Drake University between shifts. He had been texting his family updates every hour. When the texts stopped, his father said, “Your gut starts to get a feeling.”⁵
On the eighth of March, Sergeant Benjamin Pennington, twenty-six, from Glendale, Kentucky, died of wounds sustained at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia on the first of March. He had held on for seven days. Flags in Hardin County flew at half-staff.⁶
Then, on the twelfth of March, a KC-135 Stratotanker — call sign Zeus 95 — went down over western Iraq. Six aircrew.⁷ Major Alex Klinner, thirty-three, from Auburn, Alabama, left behind seven-month-old twins and a two-year-old son. His brother-in-law said the hardest thing to say was also the simplest: “He was just a really good dad.” Captain Ariana Savino, thirty-one, had only earned her pilot wings the year before. Technical Sergeant Tyler Simmons, twenty-eight, had what his family called a “million-dollar smile.”⁸
Thirteen families who will set one fewer place at the table. Children who will grow up knowing their mother or father only from photographs and the stories other people tell. That is the cost of this war on the American side, and it is real, and it deserves to be named.
Now turn the mirror.
Iran’s Health Ministry reports more than fourteen hundred people killed since the twenty-eighth of February. Over eighteen thousand injured. In Tehran alone, ten thousand homes have been damaged or destroyed.⁹ A school was struck — a hundred and seventy-five students and teachers killed.¹⁰ Secretary of War Hegseth boasts that more than fifteen thousand “enemy targets” have been struck.¹¹ Targets. He does not say homes. He does not say schools. He does not say the bakery on the corner where a man bought bread for his children every morning before the morning there was no bakery and no man and no children. The language of targeting does what it is designed to do: it makes people disappear before you have to look at what you did to them.
And the man who commands this machinery — who holds the power to end it or to escalate it, who bears the constitutional responsibility for every life spent in its execution — describes bombing a sovereign nation’s economic infrastructure as something he might do again “just for fun.”
This is not a policy disagreement. It is a window into something deeper. “Just for fun” is the language of a man who has never personally absorbed the cost of a single decision he has made. Not in business, where bankruptcy was a strategy and other people lost their homes. Not in politics, where cruelty is a brand and other people bear the consequences. Not in war, where the dead are props for a rally and their parents are told to be proud. When you have spent your entire adult life insulated from consequences — by money, by lawyers, by subordinates paid to absorb the damage — other people’s suffering becomes abstract. Entertainment. Content. Fun.
And it is not just the President. It is the administration. In the first two weeks of the war, the White House posted a series of videos to its official social media accounts that spliced real footage of American strikes on Iran with gameplay from Call of Duty, complete with the game’s “+100” kill score notifications superimposed over actual explosions. One video opened with a Grand Theft Auto meme — “Ah shit, here we go again” — before cutting to live strike footage. Another showed a real bombing followed by a clip from SpongeBob SquarePants in which the cartoon character asks, “do you want to see me do it again?” before showing another strike. A third flashed the word “wasted” — Grand Theft Auto’s kill confirmation — over footage of a real attack on what appeared to be an Iranian vehicle. A fourth ended with audio from Mortal Kombat: “Flawless victory.”¹² The White House posted these videos while the Department of War was investigating whether American forces had bombed an elementary school in Minab that killed a hundred and seventy-five people, most of them schoolgirls between the ages of seven and twelve.¹³
Senator Tammy Duckworth — a combat veteran who lost both legs in Iraq — responded: “War is not a f*cking video game. Six Americans are dead and thousands more are at needless risk because of your illegal, unjustified war. And you’re calling this a flawless victory.”¹⁴
She is right. And the gamification is not incidental to the pathology. It is the pathology. When a government presents the killing of human beings in the visual language of entertainment — when it borrows the reward mechanics of games designed to make violence pleasurable — it is not just failing to take the war seriously. It is actively training its own population not to feel what is being done in their name. The “+100” hovering over a real explosion does not inform. It anaesthetises. It turns the viewer into a spectator, then into a player, then into someone for whom the next strike is not a moral event but a content drop. This is what happens when a nation’s leadership has no personal connection to the cost of war. It becomes a brand exercise. A content strategy. Fun.
But “just for fun” is not merely callous. It has a legal name. Kharg Island is not a military installation. It is the economic lifeline of more than ninety million people — the terminal through which the oil revenues flow that pay for food, for medicine, for the infrastructure that keeps a nation functioning. Bombing it does not hurt the regime. The ayatollahs have bunkers and reserves and alternative supply chains. The shopkeeper in Isfahan does not. The mother in Shiraz who cannot afford bread because the economy has been severed at its artery does not. When you bomb a nation’s economic infrastructure to pressure its government, it is the population that absorbs the damage. Every time. Without exception.
This is not a novel observation. It is a pattern so consistent it should disqualify the strategy on its own merits. Sanctions on Iraq did not topple Saddam Hussein — they killed hundreds of thousands of children while the regime built palaces.¹⁵ The blockade on Gaza did not weaken Hamas — it radicalised a generation while civilians went hungry. In every case, the logic is the same: punish the population until they rise up against their rulers. In every case, the result is the opposite: a starving population does not rise up. It survives. The regime becomes the only entity with the resources to distribute what remains, the population becomes more dependent on it, not less, and whatever energy might have fuelled resistance is spent instead on finding the next meal, the next dose of medicine, the next safe place to sleep. You cannot bomb and starve a people into revolution. You can only bomb and starve them into submission — and the entity they submit to is the one you claimed to be fighting. It is not just cruel. It is strategically illiterate. And under international humanitarian law, it has a specific name: collective punishment. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits it explicitly.¹⁶ Targeting civilian economic infrastructure to coerce a population is not a grey area. It is a war crime.
Declan Coady was twenty years old. He was not fun. He was a person. Alex Klinner’s twins are seven months old. They are not content. They are children who will never know their father’s voice. And somewhere in Tehran, a mother is pulling her daughter’s school uniform from the rubble, and she is not an enemy target. She is a human being whose government and whose attackers have both failed her.
Was any of this legal?
That is the question this article exists to answer. Not whether it was popular. Not whether Iran’s regime deserved to fall. Not whether the strikes were strategically effective. Whether they were lawful — under the Constitution that every one of those thirteen service members swore to support and defend, and under the international order that the United States itself built and once claimed to lead.
The answer, on both counts, is no.
The Constitution
The text is not ambiguous. Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress — and Congress alone — the power to declare war. Not the President. Not the Pentagon. Not the Secretary of War. Congress. The Founders were explicit about this, and they were explicit for a reason: they had lived under a king who could send men to die on his own authority, and they designed a system to ensure that no American executive would ever hold that power unchecked. The decision to go to war — to spend the lives of citizens in organised violence against another nation — was to be made by the representatives of the people, not by one man in one room.
The last time Congress formally declared war was 1942.¹⁷
Every American conflict since — Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and now Iran — has been waged without a declaration of war. This is not a minor constitutional footnote. It is the single most consequential erosion of democratic authority in the history of the republic, and it has been built brick by brick, by presidents of both parties, over eighty-three years.
The erosion began in 1950, when President Truman committed American forces to Korea under a United Nations Security Council resolution and called it a “police action.” He never asked Congress for authorisation. Congress never demanded it. Thirty-six thousand, five hundred and seventy-four Americans died in a police action.¹⁸ The constitutional question went largely unasked, and the silence was read as consent.
In 1964, President Johnson persuaded Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution — an authorisation based on a naval incident that, as subsequent investigation revealed, did not happen as described.¹⁹ That resolution was used to escalate American involvement in Vietnam to the point where over five hundred thousand troops were deployed and nearly fifty-eight thousand Americans were killed. It was not a declaration of war. It functioned as one. And when it was over, Congress recognised that it had allowed a president to fight a full-scale war under authorities that looked nothing like what the Constitution required — and that the power to decide when America goes to war had been quietly stripped from the institution the Founders had entrusted with it.
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was Congress’s attempt to reclaim its authority, passed over President Nixon’s veto after the revelation of secret bombings in Cambodia that Congress had never authorised.²⁰ The Resolution required the president to notify Congress within forty-eight hours of committing forces to hostilities and to withdraw those forces within sixty days unless Congress granted authorisation. It was meant to be a constraint. In practice, it became a licence. Before 1973, any military action without congressional approval was constitutionally suspect. After 1973, presidents claimed an automatic sixty-day window for any operation they chose to define as “limited.” The tool designed to check executive war-making inadvertently expanded it.
And every subsequent president tested the boundary further. Reagan deployed troops to Lebanon in 1982 without citing the War Powers Resolution and did not seek congressional authorisation until after service members had already died. Clinton bombed Kosovo in 1999 and continued the campaign for more than two weeks past the sixty-day deadline, arguing that congressional funding constituted implicit authorisation — even though the War Powers Resolution explicitly states that funding alone does not constitute authorisation. Obama bombed Libya in 2011 for seven months, calling it “kinetic military action“ rather than war and claiming American involvement was “limited“ — while the United States was conducting seventy-five percent of all aerial refuelling sorties and seventy percent of the operation’s intelligence and surveillance.²¹ In his first term, Trump struck Syria without authorisation and assassinated Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in Iraq, calling it a defensive action.²²
Each violation made the next one easier. Each congressional failure to act was read by the executive as permission. Each creative legal fiction — “police action,” “kinetic military action,” “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” — expanded the zone of presidential authority until the exception became the rule.
But what is happening in Iran is not another incremental expansion. It is the pattern’s logical endpoint.
On the twenty-eighth of February 2026, the United States and Israel launched a full-scale military campaign against a sovereign nation. The operation — designated “Epic Fury” — has included the sustained bombing of military and civilian infrastructure, the assassination of a head of state, the destruction of a nation’s economic lifeline, and the explicit pursuit of regime change. The President has stated that military operations could continue for four to five weeks or longer.²³ Thirteen American service members are dead. Over a hundred and forty have been wounded.²⁴ This is not a limited engagement. It is a war by any definition the Founders would have recognised.
And Congress did not authorise it.
Trump’s war powers report, submitted to Congress on the second of March, relies on the President’s authority under Article II of the Constitution — his power as Commander in Chief.²⁵ It does not invoke the 2001 Authorisation for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which covers al-Qaeda and the Taliban and has no application to Iran. It does not invoke the 2002 Iraq AUMF, which was repealed. It does not invoke any statutory authorisation at all, because none exists. The legal basis for this war is the President’s assertion that he has the inherent constitutional authority to launch it. Nothing more.
Constitutional scholars across the political spectrum have rejected this claim. Oona Hathaway, the Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale Law School and former special counsel at the Department of Defense, has called the strikes “blatantly illegal” and stated that for the president to make the decision to go to war “unilaterally, without going to the Security Council, without going to Congress, and putting U.S. troops and allies at risk is really extraordinary and clearly unlawful.”²⁶ Iran did not attack the United States. The strikes of the twenty-eighth of February were not defensive. They were offensive, pre-planned, and launched while diplomatic negotiations were still underway. Even under the most permissive reading of Article II — the Office of Legal Counsel’s own framework, which allows presidential action where it serves “sufficiently important national interests” and does not constitute a “prolonged and substantial military engagement”²⁷ — a weeks-long bombing campaign that has killed a head of state and destabilised an entire region cannot plausibly be called limited.
Congress had the tools to stop this. The War Powers Resolution provides a fast-track process for exactly this situation. On the fourth of March, the Senate voted on a resolution that would have required the President to obtain congressional authorisation for further military action in Iran. It failed, 47 to 53, along party lines.²⁸ The following day, the House voted on a similar resolution. It failed, 212 to 219.²⁹ Congress did not authorise this war. But it also refused to end it. The effect is the same as Truman’s Korea: silence read as consent, and consent treated as authorisation.
This is what eighty-three years of erosion produces. A president can now launch a full-scale war against a sovereign nation, kill its head of state, bomb its economic infrastructure, pursue regime change, and lose American service members in the process — all without a single vote of Congress authorising the action. The constitutional power to declare war has not been repealed. It has been abandoned. Not by amendment, not by judicial decision, but by the slow, bipartisan accumulation of precedents, each one a little larger than the last, until the original design is unrecognisable.
Every one of those thirteen dead service members swore an oath. The same oath every American in uniform takes: “I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” They kept their oath. The question is whether the government that sent them to die kept its.
International Law
The constitutional case is damning. The international case is worse.
The United States did not build the post-war international legal order by accident. It built it deliberately, after two world wars had demonstrated what happens when powerful nations treat the sovereignty of weaker nations as optional. The United Nations Charter, signed in San Francisco in 1945, was America’s answer to the catastrophe of the first half of the twentieth century. Its foundational principle is simple: states do not get to bomb other states.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.³⁰ There are exactly two exceptions. The first is authorisation by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII.³¹ The second is self-defence under Article 51, which preserves “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.”³²
Neither exception applies to the war in Iran.
No Security Council resolution authorised the strikes of the twenty-eighth of February. None was sought. None could have been obtained — Russia and China would have vetoed any such resolution, and the United States knew it. The multilateral framework that America itself designed to legitimise the use of force was simply bypassed.
The self-defence argument fails on its own terms. Article 51 requires an armed attack — or, under the most expansive interpretation, an imminent one. Iran did not attack the United States. Iran did not attack Israel. Iran was, at the time the strikes were launched, engaged in diplomatic negotiations with the United States through Omani mediation. The standard for anticipatory self-defence in customary international law — the Caroline Doctrine, formulated in 1837 and reaffirmed at Nuremberg — requires that the necessity of self-defence be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”³³ A pre-planned military campaign launched two days after the most intensive round of diplomatic negotiations does not meet this standard. It does not come close.
The administration has pointed to Iran’s nuclear programme, its ballistic missile development, and its support for proxy forces as justifications for the strikes.³⁴ These are grievances. They may even be legitimate grievances. But under international law, grievances — however serious — do not authorise the use of force. If they did, any nation with a sufficiently long list of complaints about its neighbour could bomb it at will. The prohibition on the use of force exists precisely to prevent powerful states from acting as judge, jury, and executioner against weaker ones. The United States understood this in 1945. It wrote the rule.
The distinction between preventive war and pre-emptive self-defence matters here, and the administration has blurred it deliberately. Pre-emptive self-defence — striking first when an attack is genuinely imminent — has a narrow and contested legal basis. Preventive war — striking to eliminate a potential future threat — has none. The International Court of Justice has never endorsed it. The UN Charter does not permit it. The Nuremberg Tribunal, at which the United States served as chief prosecutor of Nazi war crimes, classified the waging of aggressive war as “the supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”³⁵ That language was not directed at a hypothetical. It was directed at states that launched wars of choice against sovereign nations.
The international response has confirmed the illegality, even in unprecedented fashion among traditional allies. French President Emmanuel Macron stated on the fourth of March that the strikes were conducted “outside the framework of international law, which we cannot approve.”³⁶ Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez rejected the strikes outright, refused the use of Spanish military bases, and called the war an escalation that “contributes to a more uncertain and hostile international order.”³⁷ Trump threatened to cut off all trade with Spain in response.³⁸ British Prime Minister Keir Starmer initially refused to allow UK bases to be used for offensive operations — a decision that drew public criticism from Trump, who said it took “far too long.” Starmer reversed his position on the first of March, citing the need to protect three hundred thousand British civilians in the region and to defend allied countries under Iranian retaliation. Hours later, a drone struck RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus. The UK Ministry of Defence later confirmed the drone was not launched from Iran — it was likely fired by Hezbollah from Lebanon, caused minimal damage, and produced no casualties.³⁹ Nonetheless, Starmer used the strike and the broader threat to British lives to justify opening Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford to US bombers for supposedly ‘defensive’ strikes on Iranian missile sites. Russia called the strikes “a deliberate, premeditated, and unprovoked act of armed aggression” and “a betrayal of diplomacy.”⁴⁰ China’s Foreign Ministry stated that the strikes “have no UN Security Council authorization and violate international law,” while Foreign Minister Wang Yi called it “unacceptable for the U.S. and Israel to launch attacks against Iran in the process of the ongoing Iran-U.S. negotiations, still less to blatantly attack and kill the leader of a sovereign country.”⁴¹ Switzerland accused the United States and Israel of violating international law.⁴² Norway emphasised the illegality of the war.⁴³ At the UN Security Council, China’s ambassador declared the conflict had “neither legitimacy nor legal basis.”⁴⁴ A hundred and thirty-five countries co-sponsored a Security Council resolution on the crisis — reportedly the largest number of co-sponsors in Security Council history.⁴⁵ The European Council on Foreign Relations concluded that there is “little question that the US and Israeli war against Iran is an unlawful act of aggression” and noted that “no European leader has argued the war is lawful.”⁴⁶ Professor Mohamed Arafa, writing in JURIST, described the strikes as violations of “both US constitutional law and foundational international norms, setting a dangerous precedent for unchecked executive war-making.”⁴⁷
No allied government has called this war legal. No adversarial government has called it legal. No neutral government has called it legal. Not one.
And the proportionality question compounds the illegality. Even if one were to accept — for the sake of argument — that some limited defensive action against Iranian military assets could be justified, the scope of Operation Epic Fury obliterates any proportionality defence. This is not a targeted strike on a missile launcher. It is a sustained bombing campaign that has killed over fourteen hundred people, destroyed ten thousand homes in Tehran alone, struck a girls’ school, assassinated a head of state, bombed civilian economic infrastructure, and pursued explicit regime change. The principle of proportionality under international humanitarian law requires that the harm to civilians not be excessive in relation to the concrete military advantage anticipated.⁴⁸ A campaign that bombs an oil terminal “just for fun” is not calibrating proportionality. It has abandoned the concept entirely.
The law is not ambiguous. The United States waged aggressive war against a sovereign nation without Security Council authorisation, without an armed attack to trigger self-defence, without imminence, and without proportionality. It did so while negotiations were underway. It did so against the explicit objections of its closest European allies. And it did so in violation of the legal order that the United States itself created to prevent exactly this from happening.
What is being demonstrated in Iran is not a modern exercise of power. It is a sixteenth-century mindset operating with twenty-first-century weapons — the logic of conquest dressed in the language of counterterrorism. The international legal order was built to move humanity past that logic. If it can be discarded whenever a sufficiently powerful state decides a sufficiently villainous regime deserves it, then it was never law at all. It was permission — granted by the strong to themselves, and revocable at will.
The Precedent
There is a question that runs beneath the legal arguments — beneath the constitutional text and the UN Charter and the Caroline Doctrine and the Nuremberg judgment. It is the question that the people cheering this war have not asked, because asking it would require them to think past the next news cycle.
The question is: what happens when it is your turn?
International law is not an abstraction that exists to protect distant countries and foreign people. It is the infrastructure that protects everyone — including the nation that is currently powerful enough to ignore it.
This is not a foreign concept imposed on the United States from outside. It is the foundational American idea — taken to its logical international conclusion. Aristotle said it first: “It is more proper that law should govern than any one of the citizens.”⁴⁹ Thomas Paine, in Common Sense, made it the cornerstone of the American revolution: “In America, the law is king. For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other.”⁵⁰ John Adams enshrined it in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 as “a government of laws, and not of men” — a phrase that became one of the foundational principles of American constitutional theory.⁵¹ The post-war international legal order was nothing more than the extension of this principle beyond national borders: the belief that relations between states, like relations between citizens, should be governed by law rather than by the will of the most powerful. The United States did not merely sign that order. It authored it. And it was this — not the aircraft carriers, not the nuclear arsenal, not the size of the economy — that made the world look up to America after 1945. The idea that the most powerful nation on earth would voluntarily submit itself to the same rules it asked others to follow. That was the source of American moral authority. I still have friends in Europe who believe in this vision of America — who grew up admiring what it represented, not what it could destroy. What is happening in Iran is the author tearing up its own manuscript, and with it, the reason anyone ever looked up to it in the first place. The prohibition on aggressive war does not exist because Iran deserves protection. It exists because the alternative — a world in which any state strong enough to bomb another state may do so whenever it decides the cause is sufficient — is a world in which no state is safe. Not even the strongest one. Especially not the strongest one, because the strongest one has the most enemies and the most to lose when the rules collapse.
The person cheering the bombing of Tehran today is the person who will need international law tomorrow. They will need it when a rising power decides that American military bases on its border constitute an intolerable provocation. They will need it when an adversary concludes that American sanctions amount to economic warfare justifying a military response. They will need it when the precedent set by Operation Epic Fury — that a sufficiently powerful state may launch a war of regime change against a sovereign nation without legal authorisation, while negotiations are still underway — is cited by someone else, against someone else, in a conflict that does not serve American interests. Precedents do not belong to the nations that set them. They belong to everyone who comes after.
And there is a darker question that no one in Washington seems willing to ask. The United States has now established that a sufficiently powerful state may assassinate another nation’s head of state as part of a campaign of regime change. What happens when America is no longer the most powerful state in the room? What happens when decades of military adventurism, economic overextension, and the slow erosion of alliances have weakened the republic to the point where another power — or a coalition of powers — decides that the American government itself constitutes a threat requiring removal? The protocols exist to prevent a decapitation strike on American leadership. But protocols are technical solutions to a problem that is, at its root, political. The real protection was never the bunkers or the continuity-of-government plans. It was the norm — the international consensus that heads of state are not legitimate military targets, that sovereignty means something, that regime change by force is the one thing powerful nations agreed not to do to each other. That norm is now in ruins. The United States shattered it. And the shards do not care who picks them up.
This is not speculation. It is the lesson of every international order that has ever been dismantled by the nation that built it. Rome did not fall to barbarians at the gates. It fell because it had spent centuries treating its own rules as optional — applying them to its subjects while exempting itself — until the rules meant nothing and there was no structure left to hold the empire together. The post-war order that the United States built in 1945 was designed to prevent precisely this cycle. And it worked — imperfectly, inconsistently, with glaring failures and shameful exceptions — but it worked well enough to prevent a third world war for eighty years. What is being tested in Iran is not whether the ayatollahs survive. It is whether that order survives. And if it does not, the nation that will suffer most from its collapse is the one that is currently tearing it apart.
The people who have abandoned their respect for law — who have decided that the rules are a constraint on American power rather than a foundation of American security — have made a calculation. They have calculated that the United States will always be the strongest. That no coalition will ever form against it. That no precedent it sets will ever be turned against it. That is not a strategic assessment. It is a fantasy. And it is the same fantasy that every empire in history has entertained in the years before it discovered that the rules it broke were the ones holding it up.
And here is where the legal case and the moral case converge into something that should keep every honest observer awake at night.
On the twenty-fifth of February 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated publicly that a “historic” agreement with the United States to avert military conflict was “within reach.”⁵² On the twenty-sixth of February, a third round of indirect talks took place in Geneva, mediated by Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi. On the twenty-seventh of February — one day before the strikes began — Al Busaidi appeared on CBS News and told the American people that a “peace deal is within our reach.”⁵³ He disclosed that Iran had agreed to never stockpile enriched uranium, to downgrade its existing stockpiles to the lowest level possible, and to submit to full verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. He called it “a very important breakthrough that has never been achieved in previous rounds of negotiations.”⁵⁴ This was not an Obama-era concession being reheated. This was a commitment that went beyond what the JCPOA had secured — zero stockpiling, full IAEA verification, irreversible downgrading of enriched uranium. It was, by any honest measure, a diplomatic victory for the Trump administration. The President had a win on the table. Additional talks were scheduled for the following Monday in Vienna.
They never took place. On the twenty-eighth of February, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury.
Oman’s foreign minister — the man who had spent weeks shuttling between the two sides, who had staked his country’s credibility on the negotiations — later said that the war was not prompted by an imminent threat. It was “solely an attempt to reorder the Middle East in Israel’s favour.”⁵⁵ Qatar’s foreign ministry spokesperson called the strikes “an attack on the very principle of mediation.”⁵⁶
Trita Parsi, the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, noted the unprecedented nature of Al Busaidi’s CBS appearance and suggested that the Omani foreign minister went public deliberately — “so that the American people knew that peace was within reach when Trump instead opted for war.”⁵⁷
Only twenty-one percent of Americans supported initiating an attack on Iran.⁵⁸ The negotiations were producing results that went beyond what the Obama-era JCPOA had achieved. Iran was at the table. The mediator was telling the world that a deal was close. And the President of the United States chose war anyway.
This is not a story about law in the abstract. It is a story about thirteen families who will never be whole again, about fourteen hundred Iranian dead who did not choose this war, about a school full of girls between the ages of seven and twelve who were alive on the morning of the twenty-eighth of February and dead by the afternoon. It is a story about a world that built rules to prevent exactly this, and a nation that decided the rules did not apply to it.
The law is not ambiguous. The war is illegal. The question is whether that still means anything — and if it does not, what we have become.
The legal case is clear. But law alone has never stopped a war that enough people wanted. Millions of Americans support this one, and they have reasons — the nuclear threat, the theological mandate, the media narrative, the political calculation. In Part Two, we examine each of those reasons on its own terms.
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James S. Coates writes about geopolitics, international law, and the decline of civilisational accountability. His books include A Signal Through Time, The Threshold, The Road to Khurasan, the memoir God and Country (published under pen name Will Prentiss) and his forthcoming Neither Gods Nor Monsters. He publishes regularly on Fireline Press and The Signal Dispatch, and his academic work appears on PhilPapers. He lives in the UK, with his family and dog who has no interest in any of this.
© 2026 James S. Coates All Rights Reserved. Fireline Press · fireline.press
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Endnotes
¹ Trump interview with NBC News, 15 March 2026. Trump stated that US forces had struck Kharg Island and added, “we may hit it a few more times just for fun.” Reported by NPR, CNN, and others.
² As of 16 March 2026, thirteen US service members have been killed in Operation Epic Fury: seven by enemy action, six in a KC-135 crash under investigation. An additional service member, Major Sorffly Davius, 46, died of a medical incident at Camp Buehring, Kuwait. Approximately 140 have been wounded, eight severely. Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell confirmed the figures to TIME on 10 March 2026.
³ US Central Command statement, 1 March 2026. The drone struck a tactical operations centre at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait. All six soldiers were assigned to the 103rd Sustainment Command, Army Reserve, Des Moines, Iowa.
⁴ Retired US Army Colonel Josef Sujet, then chief of staff of the 103rd Sustainment Command, told CNN that four of the six soldiers had previously served together in Kuwait in 2019. CNN, “Many of the six US troops killed in the war with Iran served together years earlier in Kuwait,” 6 March 2026.
⁵ Soldier identifications, biographical details, and family statements drawn from: Pentagon identification statements, 4–5 March 2026; NPR, “Iran war: Pentagon ID’s last 2 of the 6 U.S. soldiers killed in Kuwait attack,” 4 March 2026; CBS News, “Pentagon releases names of 6 U.S. Army Reserve soldiers killed during the ongoing war with Iran,” 4 March 2026; CNN, “Many of the six US troops killed in the war with Iran served together years earlier in Kuwait,” 6 March 2026; NBC News, “What we know about the U.S. service members killed in the Iran war,” 5 March 2026.
⁶ CNN, “Seventh US service member killed in Iran war is identified as Army sergeant,” 8 March 2026. Pennington was assigned to 1st Space Battalion, 1st Space Brigade, Fort Carson, Colorado. He was wounded at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, on 1 March and died on 8 March.
⁷ US Central Command statement, 13 March 2026. The KC-135 Stratotanker crashed in western Iraq during Operation Epic Fury. Call sign: Zeus 95. The crash involved two aircraft; the second landed safely. CENTCOM stated the loss was not due to hostile or friendly fire. The incident is under investigation. An Iranian proxy group claimed responsibility but provided no evidence.
⁸ Crew identifications and biographical details drawn from: Pentagon identification statement, 14 March 2026; Air & Space Forces Magazine, “Six Airmen Dead in KC-135 Crash During Iran Ops,” 15 March 2026; CNN, “Pentagon identifies six airmen killed in plane crash in Iraq,” 14 March 2026; Military Times, “Pentagon identifies six airmen killed in KC-135 crash in Iraq,” 15 March 2026. Klinner’s family details from GoFundMe page and family statements reported by CNN and Times of Israel.
⁹ Iran’s Health Ministry figures as reported by Al Jazeera, “Iran war: What is happening on day 16 of US-Israel attacks?” 15 March 2026. Tehran damage figure from Tehran’s governor, reported in the same article.
¹⁰ The strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls’ elementary school in Minab, Hormozgan province, occurred on 28 February 2026. Iranian authorities reported 175 killed; the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights stated victims were mainly girls aged between 7 and 12. Multiple investigations — by the New York Times, NPR, BBC Verify, CNN, and Al Jazeera — concluded the United States was likely responsible, with evidence pointing to a US Tomahawk cruise missile. A preliminary Pentagon investigation determined the strike resulted from outdated targeting coordinates provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Sources: UN OHCHR press release, 3 March 2026; CNN, “US strike likely hit school in Minab, Iran due to outdated intelligence,” 11 March 2026; NPR, “Pentagon probe points to U.S. missile hitting Iranian school,” 11 March 2026; TIME, “More Than 100 School Children Were Killed in Iran. Evidence Points to a U.S. Missile Strike,” 11 March 2026.
¹¹ Al Jazeera, “Iran war: What is happening on day 16 of US-Israel attacks?” 15 March 2026, citing Secretary of War Hegseth’s claim that more than 15,000 “enemy targets” had been struck.
¹² White House video game footage: ABC News, “White House posts so-called ‘hype’ videos combining real Iran war footage alongside movie, video game clips,” 7 March 2026; CNN, “White House posts video about Iran strikes using ‘Call of Duty’ video game footage,” 5 March 2026; Truthout, “White House Propaganda Videos Splice Horrific Iran War Footage With Video Games,” 7 March 2026; France 24, “White House releases video montages gamifying Iran war on social media,” 7 March 2026; Courthouse News Service, “’Not on the bingo card’: Use of Call of Duty footage for Iran war hype raises eyebrows,” 5 March 2026; Axios, “How America gamified its war with Iran,” 14 March 2026.
¹³ See endnote 10. The White House videos were posted between 5 and 7 March 2026. Secretary of War Hegseth announced a formal investigation into the Minab school strike on 13 March 2026. Fox News, “Hegseth announces probe of US role in strike at girls school in Minab, Iran,” 13 March 2026.
¹⁴ Senator Tammy Duckworth (@SenDuckworth), X post, 6 March 2026, quote-tweeting the White House account’s “JUSTICE THE AMERICAN WAY” video.
¹⁵ UNICEF estimated that sanctions on Iraq contributed to the deaths of approximately 500,000 children under five between 1991 and 1998. The figure has been debated by scholars, but the broad consensus is that sanctions caused mass civilian suffering while the regime remained intact. See: UNICEF, “Child and Maternal Mortality Survey 1999”; Richard Garfield, “Morbidity and Mortality among Iraqi Children from 1990 through 1998,” Fourth Freedom Forum, 1999.
¹⁶ Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Article 33: “No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”
¹⁷ The United States declared war on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania on 5 June 1942, the final formal declarations of war issued by Congress. See: National Archives, “Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force.”
¹⁸ Korean War casualty figures from the Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System.
¹⁹ The Gulf of Tonkin incident of 4 August 1964 — the alleged second attack on the USS Maddox — was later determined to have likely not occurred. The NSA’s own declassified internal history, published in 2005, concluded that the signals intelligence used to justify the resolution was flawed. See: Robert J. Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964,” Cryptologic Quarterly, declassified 2005.
²⁰ War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548, enacted 7 November 1973 over President Nixon’s veto.
²¹ US involvement in the 2011 Libya intervention: the seventy-five percent aerial refuelling and seventy percent intelligence figures are from congressional testimony and Department of Defense reporting, as cited in the War Powers Resolution article on Wikipedia and PBS reporting. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified in March 2011 that the administration did not need congressional authorisation. Obama’s characterisation of the operation as not constituting “hostilities” was widely reported.
²² Trump ordered airstrikes on Syria in April 2017 and April 2018 without congressional authorisation. The assassination of General Qasem Soleimani occurred on 3 January 2020 at Baghdad International Airport. Trump cited the 2002 Iraq AUMF and Article II authority. See: Oona Hathaway, “The Soleimani Strike Defied the U.S. Constitution,” The Atlantic, 4 January 2020.
²³ Trump stated on 3 March 2026 that military operations could last “four to five weeks, but we have capability to go far longer than that.” NPR, “6 U.S. soldiers have been killed as the war with Iran further engulfs the region,” 2 March 2026.
²⁴ Casualty and wounded figures confirmed by Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell to TIME, 10 March 2026. TIME, “What We Know About the U.S. Service Members Killed in the Iran War,” 10 March 2026.
²⁵ Lawfare, “The Law of Going to War with Iran, Redux,” March 2026. The article confirms that Trump’s 2 March war powers report relies on Article II authority alone, not any statutory enactment such as the 2001 AUMF. The 2002 Iraq AUMF was repealed in 2024.
²⁶ Hathaway called the strikes “blatantly illegal” in an X post on 28 February 2026, reported by FactCheck.org, “Legality of Latest Iran Attack in Question,” March 2026, and the Yale Daily News. Her extended quote — “For the president to make that decision unilaterally, without going to the Security Council, without going to Congress, and putting U.S. troops and allies at risk is really extraordinary and clearly unlawful” — from The New Republic, “Congress Won’t Act on the Iran Strikes. That Doesn’t Make Them Legal,” June 2025, addressing the earlier Twelve-Day War strikes but with legal analysis applying with greater force to the February 2026 campaign. See also: The Hill, “Trump’s murky legal landscape on attacking Iran,” March 2026.
²⁷ The Office of Legal Counsel framework — allowing presidential use of force where it serves “sufficiently important national interests” and does not constitute a “prolonged and substantial military engagement” — is discussed in Lawfare, “The Law of Going to War with Iran, Redux,” March 2026, and in FactCheck.org, “Legality of Latest Iran Attack in Question,” March 2026.
²⁸ Constitution Center, “Does the War Powers Resolution debate take on a new context in the Iran conflict?” March 2026. The Senate rejected the war powers resolution 47–53 on 4 March 2026.
²⁹ Al Jazeera, “US House narrowly rejects resolution to end Trump’s Iran war,” 5 March 2026. The House voted 219–212 against the resolution.
³⁰ Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
³¹ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Articles 39–51.
³² Charter of the United Nations, Article 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”
³³ The Caroline test, formulated in diplomatic correspondence between US Secretary of State Daniel Webster and British envoy Lord Ashburton in 1842, following the destruction of the American steamboat Caroline in 1837. Webster stated that a self-defence claimant must show “a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” The standard was reaffirmed by the Nuremberg Tribunal. See: Yale Law School Avalon Project, “British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case.”
³⁴ Trump’s war powers report to Congress, 2 March 2026, stated that strikes were undertaken “to protect United States forces in the region, protect the United States homeland, advance vital United States national interests, including ensuring the free flow of maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, and in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.” Reported by FactCheck.org, “Legality of Latest Iran Attack in Question,” March 2026.
³⁵ International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Judgment, 1 October 1946: “To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”
³⁶ Macron’s televised address, 4 March 2026: “The United States of America and Israel have decided to launch military operations, conducted outside of international law, which we cannot approve.” Reported by Al Jazeera, “France walks ‘fine line’ as US-Israel war on Iran escalates,” 12 March 2026; Ynet News, “Macron slams US-Israeli strikes on Iran, sends flagship aircraft carrier to Middle East,” 4 March 2026; The Telegraph via Yahoo News, “Macron: Strikes against Iran are illegal,” 4 March 2026.
³⁷ Sánchez statement on X, 28 February 2026, rejecting “the unilateral military action by the United States and Israel, which represents an escalation and contributes to a more uncertain and hostile international order.” Spain refused the use of Spanish military bases for strikes on Iran. Reported by Reuters via NewsNation, “World leaders react to Iran military strikes,” 28 February 2026; European Council on Foreign Relations, “War over law: Europe’s unforced errors over the use of force in Iran,” 12 March 2026.
³⁸ Trump stated on 4 March 2026 that he had ordered his Treasury chief to look into cutting “off all trade” with Spain. Reported by The Telegraph via Yahoo News, “Macron: Strikes against Iran are illegal,” 4 March 2026.
³⁹ Starmer initially refused to allow UK bases to be used for offensive action, a decision Trump publicly criticised. He reversed on 1 March, citing the protection of 300,000 British civilians and allied countries under attack. The drone strike on RAF Akrotiri occurred hours later, shortly after midnight on 2 March. The UK Ministry of Defence confirmed the Shahed-type drone was not launched from Iran; officials believe it was fired from Lebanon by Hezbollah. It caused minimal damage and no casualties. Sources: TIME, “British Base Hit in Cyprus, Drones Downed as Iran War Widens,” 2 March 2026; Middle East Eye, “UK says drone attack on Cyprus base was not launched from Iran,” 5 March 2026; Al Jazeera, “Starmer lets US use bases for Iran clash: UK’s military, legal quagmire,” 2 March 2026; Wikipedia, “United Kingdom involvement in the 2026 Iran war,” accessed 16 March 2026; House of Commons Library, “US-Israel strikes on Iran: February/March 2026,” research briefing, March 2026.
⁴⁰ Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia at the UN Security Council emergency session, 1 March 2026, called the strikes “a deliberate, premeditated, and unprovoked act of armed aggression against a sovereign and independent Member State, in violation of the UN Charter and international law” and “a betrayal of diplomacy.” UN News, “Iran strikes ‘squandered a chance for diplomacy’: Guterres,” 1 March 2026; Security Council Report, “Emergency Meeting on the Military Escalation in the Middle East,” 28 February 2026.
⁴¹ Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning stated on 2 March 2026 that “the U.S.-Israeli strikes against Iran have no UN Security Council authorization and violate international law.” Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated it was “unacceptable for the U.S. and Israel to launch attacks against Iran in the process of the ongoing Iran-U.S. negotiations, still less to blatantly attack and kill the leader of a sovereign country and instigate government change.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, press conferences of 2 and 3 March 2026.
⁴² Swiss Defence Minister Martin Pfister, interview with SonntagsZeitung, 8 March 2026: “The Federal Council is of the opinion that the attack on Iran constitutes a violation of international law. In our view it constitutes a violation on the prohibition of violence.” Reuters, “Iran attacks breach international law, Swiss Defence Minister says,” 8 March 2026.
⁴³ European Council on Foreign Relations, “War over law: Europe’s unforced errors over the use of force in Iran,” 12 March 2026, noting that “Norway’s government has also emphasised the illegality of the war.”
⁴⁴ China’s Ambassador Zhang Jun at the UN Security Council, as reported by Al Jazeera, “UN Security Council adopts resolution condemning Iran’s attacks in the Gulf,” 12 March 2026: the conflict had “neither legitimacy nor legal basis.”
⁴⁵ Al Jazeera, “UN Security Council adopts resolution condemning Iran’s attacks in the Gulf,” 12 March 2026. Al Jazeera’s correspondent noted that 135 countries co-sponsored the resolution, described as “the largest number of countries ever to cosponsor a Security Council draft resolution.”
⁴⁶ European Council on Foreign Relations, “War over law: Europe’s unforced errors over the use of force in Iran,” 12 March 2026. The analysis stated: “There is little question that the US and Israeli war against Iran is an unlawful act of aggression. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force except when authorised by the Security Council or in cases of self-defence against an armed attack. There is overwhelming agreement among legal scholars that neither of those applies in this case. No European leader has argued the war is lawful.”
⁴⁷ Professor Mohamed Arafa, “No Authorization, No Imminence, No Plan: The Iran Strikes and the Rule of Law,” JURIST, March 2026.
⁴⁸ The principle of proportionality in international humanitarian law is codified in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977), Article 51(5)(b), which prohibits attacks “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”
⁴⁹ Aristotle, Politics, Book III, Chapter 16.
⁵⁰ Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776).
⁵¹ Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Part the First, Article XXX, drafted by John Adams: “In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”
⁵² Al Jazeera, “Iran’s FM says deal with US ‘within reach’; Trump says he’s ‘not happy’ with talks,” 25 February 2026. Araghchi stated that the “historic opportunity to strike an unprecedented agreement” would depend on whether “diplomacy is given priority.”
⁵³ CBS News, “U.S.-Iran deal is ‘within our reach,’ Omani mediator says,” 27 February 2026. Al Busaidi appeared on “Face the Nation” and stated: “I can see that the peace deal is within our reach… if we just allow diplomacy the space it needs to get there.”
⁵⁴ Ibid. Al Busaidi disclosed that Iran had committed to “never, ever have nuclear material that will create a bomb,” that existing stockpiles would be “blended to the lowest level possible” and “converted into fuel, and that fuel will be irreversible,” and that Iran would grant the IAEA “full access” for verification. He called this “something that is not in the old deal” and “a very important breakthrough.” See also: Al Jazeera, “Peace ‘within reach’ as Iran agrees no nuclear material stockpile: Oman FM,” 28 February 2026; Common Dreams, “Oman’s Foreign Minister Said US-Iran Deal Was ‘Within Our Reach.’ Then Trump Started Bombing,” 1 March 2026.
⁵⁵ Al Jazeera, “Oman renews push for diplomacy, says ‘off-ramps available’ in Iran war,” 3 March 2026. Al Busaidi pushed back on the Trump administration’s characterisation of an “imminent threat” and maintained that “significant progress” had been made before the strikes. The characterisation of the war as an attempt to reorder the Middle East in Israel’s favour is from Wikipedia, “2025–2026 Iran–United States negotiations,” citing Al Busaidi’s post-war comments, accessed 16 March 2026.
⁵⁶ Al Jazeera, “Oman renews push for diplomacy, says ‘off-ramps available’ in Iran war,” 3 March 2026. Majed al-Ansari, spokesperson for Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made the statement following Iranian retaliatory strikes on Omani territory.
⁵⁷ Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, quoted in Common Dreams, “Oman’s Foreign Minister Said US-Iran Deal Was ‘Within Our Reach.’ Then Trump Started Bombing,” 1 March 2026.
⁵⁸ Common Dreams, ibid., citing a survey released in February 2026 showing twenty-one percent support for initiating an attack on Iran “under the current circumstances.”